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ERIK S. JAFFE: I’m Erik Jaffe. I’m Chairman of the Free Speech and
Election Law Practice Group, and our group is co-sponsoring this panel, so we
would like to welcome you all here and thank you for coming, and encourage
you, if you are interested in First Amendment issues and election law issues, to
please get involved with the Practice Group. We could always use more people
who are interested in writing or helping out, so contact me, contact Dean Reuter,
whoever you like, but if this is the stuff that interests you—and I hope it does,
because you are here—please get involved. We could always use more folks.
My role here today is really just to introduce the moderator. Justice David
Stras is Associate Justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court. He has been so since
2010. He is going to introduce the remainder of the speakers and moderate the
panel. The only other thing I will say about him, other than him being a justice,
which is more than enough for folks to know his credibility, is that he is a former
Justice Thomas clerk which I think is a fine, fine honor. So thank you, Justice
Stras.
[Applause.]
JUSTICE DAVID R. STRAS: Thank you, Erik. I appreciate it. What we are
going to talk about today is the First Amendment and its relationship to process;
hence, the name of the panel, “How First Amendment Procedures Protect First
Amendment Substance.” We have a disparate group of panelists that are going
to talk about various things. So in that sense, this might be a little different than
some of the panels. Some folks are going to talk about civil restraining orders.
Others are going to talk about evidentiary burdens of proof, but the theme that
brings it all together, these are procedures that relate to First Amendment rights.
So I think we are going to get a lot out of the panel, and this is something that is
litigated on a daily basis. At least before my court, we had a case a year ago
dealing with civil restraining orders.1 We also have our fair share of cases
dealing with burdens of proof and evidentiary issues. So I think this panel is
very, very timely.
We are going to start out with Professor Volokh. He is the Gary Schwartz
Professor of Law at UCLA Law School. He is a prolific scholar, as you well
know, who has authored a number of books and articles on the First Amendment
and has a casebook on the First Amendment. In addition to teaching courses on
the First Amendment, he supervises a First Amendment Amicus Brief Clinic at
UCLA.2 Many of you are familiar with his blog posts on The Volokh
Conspiracy.3 So I now turn it over to Professor Volokh.
PROFESSOR EUGENE VOLOKH: Thank you. Thank you very much.

1. See generally Rew v. Bergstrom, 845 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 2014).
2. Scott & Cyan Banister First Amendment Clinic, UCLA LAW, https://www.law.ucla.edu/
academics/clinical-and-experiential-programs/the-clinical-experience/banister-first-amendmentclinic/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2015).
3. WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/ (last visited
Nov. 9, 2015).
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[Applause.]
PROFESSOR EUGENE VOLOKH: This panel is about how First
Amendment procedures protect First Amendment substance—an issue that is
certainly not new in First Amendment law. In fact, some of the Supreme Court’s
earliest cases have dealt with exactly this issue: prior restraints, injunctions,
allocation of burden of proof, and the like. To focus on this issue, let us set aside
the debate about the substantive scope of various speech protections. Let us
assume that there is some substantively permissible speech restriction, such as
libel law. Let us assume there is an obscenity exception. Let us assume there is
an exception for speech that infringes copyright or for telephone harassment or
something along those lines.
And let us then ask: What procedural rules constrain the definition or
implementation of the exception? Just because, for example, there is a
defamation exception, does that mean there can be a preliminary injunction
against defamation? Does that mean you can have criminal punishment of
defamation? Does it tell us anything about who must bear the burden of proof
in defamation cases? And the same for the other areas. These procedural
questions turn out to be tremendously important, both as a practical matter and
as a conceptual matter. My job here is just to outline the basic shape of the issue
and maybe identify a few modern applications.
One classic example of a First Amendment procedural rule is the prior
restraint doctrine. It dates back in American case law at least to 18394 and
probably earlier. Indeed, it used to be an especially important rule back when
there was very limited protection against criminal punishment or against civil
liability—but there would be very strong protection against injunctions. Today,
there is actually weaker protection against injunctions than before, and a much
stronger protection against civil and criminal liability than before, so the prior
restraint doctrine is less important than it once was; but it remains significant.
And again, the doctrine is about the procedure—how can libel law and similar
restrictions be implemented—and not just about the substantive question of the
proper scope of defamation liability.
The vagueness doctrine is another example, as is the overbreadth doctrine.
The overbreadth doctrine says, “you can challenge a speech restriction on its
face as overbroad, even though in other areas of constitutional law you normally
would only be able to challenge the law as applied.” And the theory behind the
doctrine is that First Amendment rights are so in danger of being chilled—so in
danger of being deterred by overbroad restrictions—that we will allow even
people whose speech might be constitutionally restrictable by a narrow law to
also challenge the broader law. This sort of challenge is a way of protecting
third parties whose speech might otherwise be chilled by the overbroad speech
restriction.

4. Brandreth v. Lance, 8 Paige Ch. 24, 24 (N.Y. Ch. 1839).
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Another procedural rule relates to standing for pre-enforcement challenges; as
the Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus5 case just last term reaffirmed, there is
pretty substantial room for such challenges.6 You do not have to wait until you
are being prosecuted under some speech restriction to try to get that restriction
thrown out. At least in many situations, if it seems quite likely that you would
be prosecuted for speaking, you do not have to risk prison in order to bring the
challenge.
The allocation of the burden of proof is another important rule. As I will
mention shortly, in some First Amendment cases—libel cases are a classic
example—the Court has said that the plaintiff must prove the falsity of a
statement; the traditional common-law rule was that the defendant must prove
its truth.7
The required quantum of proof is also influenced by the First Amendment:
actual malice in libel cases, for instance, must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence, and not just preponderance of the evidence. That, too, is an important
procedural protection.8
Same for independent appellate review. Say the question in a case is whether
speech fits within a constitutionally valid restriction—whether it constitutes
libel, fighting words, obscenity, and the like. That decision is to be reviewed
not by deferring to the factfinder’s application of law to fact (a common standard
of review in such cases), but rather through de novo review by appellate courts.9
And there might be some procedural rules as well, though the matter is not
clear. For instance, even when civil liability for libel, invasion of privacy, or
intentional infliction of emotional distress is permissible, might criminal liability
sometimes be forbidden? The Supreme Court has not squarely confronted this.
Now on to a few quick descriptions of how these things play out today in areas
where they are particularly salient. One problem that we face with the prior
restraint doctrine, and there are cases coming up every year about this—there
was one particularly interesting one from Texas10—is that it is not clear what
constitutes an unconstitutional prior restraint.
A traditional articulation of the doctrine was that, while criminal liability or
civil liability punishes speech after the fact, a prior restraint restricts speech
before the fact. There is a line by Chief Justice Burger in Nebraska Press

5. 134 S. Ct. 2334 (2014).
6. Id. at 2342.
7. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777–78 (1986).
8. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974).
9. See Eugene Volokh & Brett McDonnell, Freedom of Speech and Independent Judgment
Review in Copyright Cases, 107 YALE L.J. 2431, 2435–38 (1998).
10. Kinney v. Barnes, 443 S.W.3d 87, 101 (Tex. 2014) (holding that “while a permanent
injunction requiring the removal of posted speech that has been adjudicated defamatory is not a
prior restraint, an injunction prohibiting future speech based on that adjudication impermissibly
threatens to sweep protected speech into its prohibition”).
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Association v. Stuart11 that “subsequent liability chills, but a prior restraint
freezes.” It is a nice-sounding line.12 But at least since the 1950s, the Court has
recognized at times that in fact there is not that much difference between these
quintessential subsequent punishments and prior restraint. Criminal liability and
civil liability deter speech before it is said. That is in fact often the purpose of
such liability.
On the other hand, injunctions are usually enforced after the forbidden speech
is said. There are a few situations when injunctions actually prevent speech,
such as when the state seizes copies of allegedly obscene material.13 But often
the injunction says you will be criminally punished (for criminal contempt) if
you say something. A criminal law may say the same thing. What really is the
difference?
What seems to have emerged from this debate is that restraints prior to a
finding that the speech is unprotected are likely unconstitutional. So a
preliminary injunction against a person’s speech is unconstitutional because it is
prior to a judgment on the merits that the speech is unprotected. Such an
injunction is based only on a showing of, say, probable cause,14 or a likelihood
of success on the merits; that is not enough to justify restricting speech.
But what about permanent injunctions? Many courts that have dealt with this
have concluded, much to the surprise, I think, of many who have been following
this, that you can get an injunction against libel.15 The old rule that equity will
not enjoin a libel does not seem to be the rule any more, at least in many states,
once there has been a finding on the merits that speech is unprotected.
This openness to permanent injunctions against libel actually ends up being
pretty important, especially in the Internet age. A lot of Internet speakers have
no money, so they are not much worried about the threat of civil liability for
defamation. Often, the only way to get such speakers’ speech taken down is
through an injunction, once courts find that the material is defamatory. Query
whether that should justify injunctions; maybe a plaintiff should be limited to
damages, even if he practically cannot recover those damages. But there might
be good reason to let people seek permanent injunctions these days against
people who cannot be deterred by the threat of damages.

11. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
12. Id. at 559.
13. See, e.g., Fort Wayne Brooks, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 65–67 (1989) (striking down
an Indiana statute, providing for the seizure of materials deemed obscene in violation of RICO, on
the grounds that necessary First Amendment procedural safeguards determining obscenity were
absent).
14. See, e.g., Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308, 317 (1980).
15. See, e.g., Hill v. Petrotech Res. Corp., 325 S.W.3d 302, 313 (Ky. 2010); St. James
Healthcare v. Cole, 178 P.3d 696, 705 (Mont. 2008); Balboa Island Vill. Inn, Inc. v. Lemen, 156
P.3d 339, 343–44 (Cal. 2007); Retail Credit Co. v. Russell, 218 S.E.2d 54, 62–63 (Ga. 1975);
O’Brien v. Univ. Cmty. Tenants Union, Inc., 327 N.E.2d 753, 755 (Ohio 1975).
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What about limits on criminal prosecutions? Justice Stevens actually argued
that criminal obscenity laws are unconstitutional even though civil injunctions
against the display of particular obscene works would be constitutional.16 He
did not join Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stewart, who objected to obscenity
law altogether.17 Justice Stevens took the view that civil obscenity laws are
permissible, but criminal laws just did not provide enough notice—you should
not go to jail based on a jury’s concluding that speech appeals to the prurient
interest, or violates contemporary community standards, or lacks serious value
because it is too hard to predict whether a jury would so find.18
But Justice Stevens lost. Criminal obscenity bans, if they are narrow enough,
remain constitutional.
Likewise, though a lot of people assume that criminal libel is also
unconstitutional, the Court’s most recent decision on the case (in 1964) simply
said criminal libel law must satisfy the New York Times v. Sullivan19 actual
malice standards, when those are applicable.20 Right now, about half of the
states do not have criminal libel laws.21 Some have such laws, but never enforce
them. But some states do enforce them; for instance, Wisconsin apparently does,
and every year there are several prosecutions.22 A recent study of Wisconsin
criminal libel cases suggests that they are reasonable prosecutions, against
speakers who deliberately lied about others, almost always on purely private
matters.
Again, in the Internet age, when there are many defendant speakers who have
no money, and plaintiffs often equally have no money, the only way to vindicate
the person’s reputation might be to have the prosecutors step in. They would
need to prosecute the defendant for libel under the proper standards of proof,
with the proper mental state requirements. But if the requisite elements are
proved, then some modest punishment under criminal libel law, the study claims,
is constitutional—and Wisconsin courts seem to agree. Query whether that is
right.
The other interesting question is how far the criminal law should go in
restricting speech beyond libel. A lot of recent laws having to do with things
like so-called “cyber bullying,” stalking, harassment, and the like, criminalize
speech that might be actionable under the tort of intentional infliction of
16. See Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 316–18 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
17. Id. at 310–11.
18. See Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 507–08, 515, 517–18 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
see also Smith, 431 U.S. at 313–16, 319–21 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
19. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
20. Id. at 279–80.
21. See Bill Kenworthy & Beth Chesterman, Criminal Libel Statutes State by State, FIRST
AMEND. CTR. (Aug. 10, 2006), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/criminal-libel-statutes-stateby-state.
22. See generally David Pritchard, Rethinking Criminal Libel: An Empirical Study, 14 COMM.
L. & POL’Y 303 (2009).
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emotional distress or disclosure of private facts—speech that we had long
thought was at most civilly actionable, but is now potentially criminal. Might
the definition of those torts be too vague or too broad for the criminal law? Or
could these torts indeed be turned into crimes?
As I mentioned, actual malice in libel cases must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence. Falsehood must be proved by the plaintiff, rather than the
truth being proved by defendant. How much of that can be applied by analogy
to other elements of other speech restrictions? For example, in copyright cases,
should absence of fair use be something that the plaintiff must prove as opposed
to fair use being something that the defendant must prove?23 In non-advertising,
non-commercial speech trademark cases, of which there are quite a few—often
involving parody—should likelihood of confusion have to be shown by clear
and convincing evidence and not just by a preponderance of the evidence?
And finally, let me close with one thought I had about some of these rules.
One function of some of these rules (even if not the conscious purpose, and not
relevant in all cases) has had to do with quality of lawyering. Better lawyers can
make better arguments, and some of these rules help bring better lawyering into
situations where there would otherwise be no lawyer at all, or perhaps a lawyer
who is not knowledgeable enough on First Amendment law.
I have two particular examples. One is the prior restraint doctrine. Among
other things, the doctrine limits injunctions, which can otherwise be gotten even
when the defendant does not have a lawyer; the doctrine thus makes it more
likely that a lawyer will indeed be available when a speech restriction is
involved.
One of the things that I think Aaron is going to touch on is that, in a lot of
these restraining order cases, the court issues a very broad order—sometimes an
order such as “do not say anything about the plaintiff,” when the plaintiff is upset
at what she claims is cyber stalking. “You cannot say anything about the
plaintiff” is pretty clearly unconstitutional, or so it seems to me. But when such
an order is issued in a civil restraining order case, there is often no defense
lawyer involved. And the defendant may be unable to challenge the order, and
may not even know that there is some possible constitutional ground for the
challenge.
Then if the defendant is prosecuted for contempt of court for violating the
injunction, at that point, in many states that follow the collateral bar rule, the
injunction cannot be challenged.24 You have to follow it, and the public
defender that the speaker gets in that criminal prosecution is no longer able in
many situations to raise a First Amendment objection.
The other example of how First Amendment procedural rules help improve
the quality of lawyering comes in the overbreadth doctrine, and the related
relaxed rules of ripeness, which allow a challenge to be brought by experienced
23. See Volokh & McDonnell, supra note 9, at 2468.
24. See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 315–18, 320–21 (1967).
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First Amendment litigators and not just public defenders. Obviously, such
challenges are more likely to be brought by public defenders than by
unrepresented defendants. But while many public defenders are very good
criminal lawyers, many of them just do not have a lot of First Amendment
experience. First Amendment law is just not something that they practice day
in and day out. So when the case comes up, they may not be able to challenge
the law quite as effectively.
Yet overbreadth doctrine and the relaxation of the ripeness rules make it
possible for experienced First Amendment litigators—Alan Morrison, for
example—to go into a state and say: “Look, there is this speech-restrictive
statute. It has not yet been violated. We do not have to wait for it to be violated
and then hear about it and then swoop in and give this person really good First
Amendment representation. We can ourselves craft a First Amendment
challenge to the statute, and bring up the best First Amendment arguments
because we know what they are in a way that many public defenders do not.”
So that is a thought about one of the functions—though again, not a
deliberately designed function—that at least three of these doctrines (the prior
restraint doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine, and the relaxation of ripeness rules)
have played in improving the quality of First Amendment lawyering before
judges, including perhaps before Justice Stras.
So with that, I close, and I turn things over to my colleagues.
[Applause.]
JUSTICE DAVID R. STRAS: Thank you, Eugene. I appreciate it. And just
to repeat, there are a lot of seats up front if anyone wants to move up.
PROFESSOR EUGENE VOLOKH: And we will not call on you.
JUSTICE DAVID R. STRAS: We will not call on you. I am a former law
school professor. We have many law school professors up here. So we do have
the ability to call on you, but we will not.
Our second speaker is Professor Caplan, who is a faculty member at Loyola
Law School in Los Angeles. Just a brief look at his publication list reveals to
me why he is on this panel. He has written a number of articles on the First
Amendment, including a recent article on free speech and civil restraining orders
in the Hastings Law Journal,25 which I believe is going to be a large part of his
talk today. Prior to joining the Academy in 2008, he was a full-time staff
attorney for the ACLU in Washington. Please welcome Professor Caplan.
[Applause.]
PROFESSOR AARON H. CAPLAN: Thanks very much, Justice Stras. I am
here to give a case study of a type of litigation where free speech and due process
issues interact with each other in all sorts of fascinating ways. This is the area
that I have been calling “civil harassment orders.” The names are different in
different states, but basically we are talking about a statute that authorizes any
25. See generally Aaron H. Caplan, Free Speech and Civil Harassment Orders, 64 HASTINGS
L.J. 781 (2013).
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person to go to court and get a restraining order against any other person, on the
grounds that the defendant was engaged in harassment.26
How did these statutes come about? A little bit of background is in order. We
can actually start with the problem of domestic violence. Before we had
domestic violence restraining orders, there was a very practical problem of
policing. If there is a call that there has been violence in a house, the officer
who shows up faces a difficult “he-said-she-said” situation. How do I know, as
the officer, who to believe? Do I really have probable cause to make an arrest
in a criminal case? These difficulties led to under-enforcement, or at least to the
perception that officers were being too cautious in making arrests. So enter the
domestic violence restraining order, a document that makes enforcement a lot
easier. As a victim, you have a civil action available, where by a preponderance
of the evidence you can get an order that says the defendant has to stay so many
feet away from you. At that point, enforcement becomes really easy. All you
have to do is say: “Officer, look at this order. It says this person is not supposed
to contact me, but he contacted me.” This is really easy to enforce and prove.
In an area where there was under-enforcement, it was a pretty useful thing.
So we start with domestic violence restraining orders. The concept then gets
expanded. Sometimes statutes make no-contact orders available to people who
are not actually living together or romantically involved with each other. You
might have a stranger who decides to stalk somebody, or you might have a really
aggravating neighbor who is doing things to make your life miserable. The
legislatures in some states expanded their statutes, or created new statutes, so
that you can now get an injunction against someone who has harassed you,
regardless of the relationship, in about half of the states.
What do these no-contact orders have to do with speech? Two primary things.
First, the definition of harassment often allows for a finding of harassment based
just on speech. Where speech itself is deemed harassment, it becomes a basis
for liability. Second, the remedy can implicate free speech. Depending on how
these orders are written, they might say that you cannot talk about this person or
you cannot utter words containing certain content specified in the order. Now,
I think a true no-contact order—one that says “do not contact this person” or “do
not come within 200 feet of this person”—is not properly viewed as a speech
restriction. However, there is a serious prior restraint problem with orders that
say, “do not say anything on the Internet about this person.” This kind of order
is targeted at speech containing particular content. I was very honored to have
Professor Volokh represent me as an amicus in a case that is in front of the
Georgia Supreme Court that involves exactly that kind of order.27
So how does due process interact with freedom of speech in this type of
litigation? I can identify four different ways.

26. See id. at 783.
27. See Chan v. Ellis, 770 S.E.2d 851 (Ga. 2015).
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First is the vagueness doctrine. Vagueness, as any of you criminal defense
lawyers know, is not limited to the free speech context. It was originally a due
process concept relating to criminal law. If a criminal law is so vague that you
cannot really tell whether you are going to be in legal trouble or not, that is a
constitutional problem.
The vagueness in civil harassment laws depends how they are written, but
most have serious vagueness problems. My favorite one is from Wyoming. I
am going to leave out some subsections, but everything I read will be from the
Wyoming statute. Under that law, harassment occurs “if, with intent to harass
another person”—28
[Laughter.]
PROFESSOR AARON H. CAPLAN:—“the person engages in a course of
conduct reasonably likely to harass that person”—
[Laughter.]
PROFESSOR AARON H. CAPLAN:—“including but not limited to . . .
[c]ommunicating . . . in a manner that harasses; . . . [or] engaging in a course of
conduct that harasses another person.”29
Thank you, legislature, that really helps.
Vagueness raises a particular problem in First Amendment cases that does not
occur in your run-of-the-mill criminal law vagueness case. Where speech is
involved, we are worried about a chilling effect.30 It is bad enough that people
do not know whether their conduct is lawful. It is considered worse if you do
not know whether your speech is lawful, because it will cause you to engage in
self-censorship. I am not sure how we assign vagueness points to the difference
between ordinary vagueness and free speech vagueness. I doubt any judges
think to themselves, “gee, if this case did not involve speech, I would say this
statute is a 3.5 on the vagueness scale, but since it is a speech case, I think it is a
4.7 on the vagueness scale.” But even if it cannot be precisely measured, there
is a recognition that vagueness causes an extra type of harm when it contributes
to a chilling effect.
The prior restraint doctrine is a second issue that involves procedural
protections for free speech. If a plaintiff in a civil harassment case is able to
convince the judge that harassment has occurred, the result will be an injunction.
Depending on how the injunction is written, it might put certain speech off
limits. Professor Volokh is absolutely right that there are a lot of different
formulas to describe what is a prior restraint. I think of a prior restraint as a law
that makes it illegal to speak without permission. If you have to go to the censor

28. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-506(b) (2015).
29. Id. § 6-2-506(b)(i)–(iv).
30. See Caplan, supra note 25, at 810–11 (stating that “a vague statute affecting expression
has a chilling, self-censoring effect on speakers”) (citing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 871–72
(1997); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104,
109 (1972)).
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and get permission before publishing, or you have to go to the judge to lift an
injunction before speaking, you can in effect be punished for speaking without
permission. That explains why an injunction that says “you cannot say anything
about this person” is a classic prior restraint.
One line that helps separate a legitimate no-contact order from an invalid prior
restraint is the distinction between speaking to the victim and speaking about the
victim. Certainly, if someone is stalking you, calling you, sending you e-mails,
sending you texts, sending you letters, and showing up at your home or work,
we are concerned about the unwanted contact. The content of the speech
contained in those calls, e-mails, texts, letters, and personal visits does not
matter: it is equally alarming if the person says “I love you” or “I hate you.” As
a result, an order to stop all contact will be a content-neutral regulation of
conduct, and not a prior restraint on the content of speech. To be sure, an order
limiting contact will limit the defendant’s opportunity to speak to the victim, but
this is an acceptable collateral consequence of a restriction on conduct. By
contrast, an order specifying what a person is allowed to say about a person is a
restriction of speech per se, not on the conduct of engaging in unwanted contact.
Much speech about a person is directed to third parties, or to the world at large
on the Internet. Speech like that is not directed to the victim.
The distinction between speech to a person and speech about a person arises
in a category of civil harassment cases that are basically defamation cases in
disguise. In these cases, a plaintiff might say: “I am being harassed when the
defendant says or writes terrible things about me.” The plaintiff might
subjectively feel harassed, whatever that means, but the alleged wrongdoing is
actually defamation: saying false things that injure reputation. Under New York
Times v. Sullivan,31 and all of the cases that came after it, we do not want
defamation to be an easy claim to win. There are many constitutionally derived
limits on the tort. It should not be possible to avoid these limits by saying, “oh,
this is not a defamation action, it is a harassment action.” If this reframing is
allowed, the case becomes easier to win, frustrating the goal of New York Times
v. Sullivan.
What makes civil harassment cases easy to win? This brings us to a third
relevant aspect of due process: namely, the way procedures in ordinary civil
trials typically do not govern in civil harassment cases. The domestic violence
restraining order was designed to be easy to obtain, and there are some good
reasons for that. They are designed so that pro se litigants can obtain them. The
hearings are often ex parte, especially at the opening stage that corresponds to a
temporary restraining order. There is no jury, and the procedures are fast.
Judges typically churn through the civil harassment docket quickly. The things
that we would usually rely on to make sure that judges are deciding things
correctly are put in peril.

31. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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What do we usually rely on? We usually rely on lawyers giving the judge an
accurate description of what the law is. If the cases are handled pro se, nobody
is going to raise this highfalutin vagueness argument about how the statute does
not give fair notice, or a technical argument about prior restraints. Instead, the
untrained pro se will choose less legally persuasive arguments, like: “Oh, no, I
did not say that,” or, “she deserved it,” or whatever. So the judges often do not
have the presentations from the lawyers that might help them. We also rely on
the appeals process to preserve accuracy of trial courts, but this is an area where
there are very few appeals. A lot of this has to do, once again, with the fact that
it is pro se. But another factor making appeals difficult is that the orders are
often, but not always, of a fixed duration, so they can be mooted out on appeal
before an appellate decision can be made on the merits.
This brings us to the fourth area where procedural protection interacts with
free speech. If an appeal of a civil harassment order is taken, it will benefit from
a First Amendment procedural novelty: the doctrine of independent review. A
line of Supreme Court cases says that on the appeal of a free speech case, the
reviewing court must conduct an independent review of the crucial speechrelated facts.32 Hence, if a defendant argued below that certain speech should
not be considered harassment because it is constitutionally protected, the
protected status of that speech can be revisited on appeal. Trial court findings
on that topic are not entitled to the usual deference that appellate courts give to
trial court factual findings or findings involving mixed questions of law and fact.
So on those occasions when speech-related harassment is appealed, there is a
little quantum of extra procedural opportunity that you would not have in another
kind of case.
So that is a quick outline of some of the ways that procedure meets speech in
civil harassment litigation. I look forward to talking to you more about it in the
Q&A.
[Applause.]
JUSTICE DAVID R. STRAS: Thank you, Aaron. That was enlightening. Our
next speaker is Todd P. Graves, who is a lawyer in private practice with the law
firm of Graves Garrett. Before joining the firm, he served as the United States
Attorney for the Western District of Missouri. He represents individuals and
businesses nationwide before federal and state courts and administrative
agencies, and his areas of expertise include white-collar criminal defense,
political speech and election law, internal investigations, regulatory compliance,
and complex commercial litigation. I will turn it over to Mr. Graves.
[Applause.]
TODD P. GRAVES: Thank you. I appreciate that. I am sort of bringing the
practitioner’s perspective to this. I do not spend a lot of time thinking about the
broad principles as much as dealing with the nitty-gritty of it, and in the last two
years, we have handled speech cases, especially in campaign finance realms,
32. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
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probably in a half a dozen or more states. And one of the conclusions that I have
come to is that in many election law cases, there are no effective procedures to
vindicate constitutional rights.
In the election law context, in the practitioner’s world, the government shoots
first and asks questions later, and there is sort of a general background now that
I perceive among some judges, many prosecutors, and many enforcement
officials, that money is bad and that it should be prohibited. There is this new
term that popped up in the last few years called “dark money.”33 It is legal
money, but it is “dark” in some ways, and that term is thrown around quite a bit.
And another thing that complicates it—we often deal in state law matters
rather than in federal law matters, or FEC matters, and state laws are a mess.
One of the reasons they are a mess is every legislator has something that
happened to them in the last election that they want to make illegal in the next
election.
[Laughter.]
TODD P. GRAVES: And it goes both ways. So they are freelancing. They
are not using model legislation. They are not coherent, they are trying to draft
legislation that deals with something that they have a bone that they have to pick,
and to say it as boldly and bluntly as I can, many state law regulators, ethics
commissions, accountability boards, whatever you want to call it—political
practice commissioners—are zealots in this area, and they have a particular
opinion of the way the law should be. And the contra, the flip side of that is
many of my clients, whether they are a C3, C4 candidate, whatever, they are also
zealots in the matter. They not only think it is legal, they think it is their
constitutional God-given right to participate. I happen to agree with them, but
to participate in this way. So it is not like a murder case. No one says murder
should be okay. They say, “well, my client did not really do that, but we all
agree murder is bad.” In this case, you have got the government official saying,
“this is bad,” and you have got the practitioner saying, “this is good. This is
what our government is about,” and so they are kind of like ships passing in the
night, and especially when you get to the state level. Especially when you get
outside the ethics commission-type enforcement environment and you get into
state-level prosecutors, oftentimes they have no idea about the nuances of the
law.
I have had a prosecutor tell me, “you know, I do not know about all that stuff
you are talking about, but we just kind of think this is bad, and it should not be
allowed.” More than one time, I have had a dope prosecutor, someone who
normally has a dope case, then someone puts a file on their desk and now they
33. See Heather K. Gerken, The Real Problem with Citizens United: Campaign Finance,
Dark Money, and Shadow Parties, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 903, 905 (2014) (defining “dark money” as
“money spent by sources that are virtually untraceable”); Trevor Potter & Bryson B. Morgan, The
History of Undisclosed Spending in U.S. Elections & How 2012 Became the “Dark Money”
Election, 27 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 383, 458 (2013) (discussing the increased
use of “dark money” in elections).
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are a campaign speech prosecutor. That is something that in the real world you
deal with. Frequently, these cases are ginned up by the opposition, by political
opponents. Then they are weaponized with an assist from the media. So you
have got a very short period of time that you are dealing with, before an election
and these allegations are coming forward.
There is little ability to challenge this. So many times when I describe these
cases to my friends who are in a more academic environment, or friends in the
Federalist Society, they will say: “Well, that is not appropriate. That cannot be
allowed.” And they are right. We are not going to get a hearing. It is happening,
and it is being allowed, and that is what we deal with.
These cases and the Susan B. Anthony34 case—a great case Professor Volokh
mentioned—but this is before a probable cause finding. Susan B. Anthony had
a probable cause finding.35 In the FBI lexicon alone, there are three levels of
investigation, and only the third level involves a grand jury.36 There is an
informal investigation, a formal investigation, and a grand jury investigation that
is also opened up in the U.S. Attorney’s office, and you do not get a probable
cause finding until the end of a grand jury investigation. So you are dealing in
a realm where there is no judge to protect you in many cases.
The other thing that we run into, as this becomes a more contentious area of
the law, we have gone from maybe two or three years ago, we had civil fights
that we were having. Now you are having a criminal fight over an area of the
law that is not settled. Much of it is federal constitutional law. There are
definitely—just read the recent Supreme Court opinions,37 and some of them
seem to be much more liberal in allowing speech than maybe a constitutional
opinion of just a few years ago. So it is a murky area, express advocacy, nonexpress advocacy, all of that, and you have got a criminal enforcement action
taking place.
The stakes are very high, and in state court, if you have confusing laws, high
stakes, important outcomes, and you also have the abstention doctrines,38 the
34. 134 S. Ct. 2334 (2014).
35. Id. at 2339.
36. See A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS, FBI, https://
www.fbi.gov/stats-services/victim_assistance/a-brief-description-of-the-federal-criminal-justiceprocess (last visited Nov. 11, 2015).
37. See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2008–09, 2012 (2015) (holding that a finding
of intent, rather than mere negligence, is required to convict under federal extortion and threats law,
reversing the Third Circuit’s holding, which held that the negligent transmission of a
communication containing a threat to another person through interstate commerce is sufficient);
see also Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2338, 2343–45 (2014) (reversing and
remanding the Sixth Circuit’s finding of non-justiciability because the political advocacy
organization-petitioner had alleged a sufficient imminent injury from a credible threat of preenforcement of a “false statement statute” prohibiting “false statements” made “during the course
of a political campaign” against them).
38. See Calvin R. Massey, Abstention and the Constitutional Limits of the Judicial Power of
the United States, 1991 BYU L. REV. 811, 832–33 (1991) (writing that abstention encompasses a
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various abstention doctrines. So the federal courts are not going to get involved,
and they are certainly not going to get involved very quickly.
So against that backdrop, you have a quantum of proof, a burden—there is no
burden of proof. There is no quantum of proof because it is an investigation,
and at the same time—and this happens every day—you have patterned leaks
from the prosecution, the investigation authorities, and you have timing issues
and very little time.
I had a case this last election cycle where forty days before the general
election, I had an FBI agent in a statehouse going up and down the hallway
asking where the Lieutenant Governor’s office was because he had a few
questions to ask him, and if you do not think that hits the press and has a real
effect, then you are not living in the real world.
The other thing you deal with, many of you, some of you may have been
involved in campaigns. Campaigns last fifty, sixty days. It is high compression.
A lot is going on. You have some kind of subpoena drop or an investigation
leaked, and suddenly, you have lawyers telling people not to talk, the campaign
manager, “well you cannot talk to anybody you work with,” and that is just not
practical. And again, the procedural protections just do not play out.
The other thing that you run into is you have donor fears, personal fears in a
campaign finance investigation. They fear that they are going to be investigated
personally. They fear that their relationships and communications—who here
has not written an e-mail that they really would rather not read themselves again,
let alone have other people read? They fear disclosure and retribution, which
has clearly happened at the end of some campaigns in the last few years based
on their contributions or their involvement,39 and one of the things that is very
real also is the understanding of the organization and the weak points of a
particular political movement. That is important information.
We just had caucus elections in Congress, and those were behind closed doors,
and those were behind closed doors for a reason, because they want to keep
private those sorts of weak points and disagreements in some cases.
Against all of this, courts are highly reluctant to wade into that charged
environment, especially in a very political and tense time. Anytime you get one
of these cases before a court, you may have a judge that is the paragon of judicial
virtue, and you bring one of these political cases in, and oftentimes they sort of
revert to what they thought before they went on the bench. Strange questions
variety of doctrines involving “the outright rejection or postponement by a federal court of its
jurisdiction ‘even though Congress has vested jurisdiction in the federal courts to hear the cases in
question’”) (quoting M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF
JUDICIAL POWER 233 (1980)).
39. See, e.g., Stephanie Condon, Target Apologizes for Controversial Political Donation,
CBS NEWS (Aug. 5, 2015, 2:46 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/target-apologizes-forcontroversial-political-donation/; John Koblin, George Stephanopoulos Apologizes to Viewers on
Clinton Donations, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://www.nytimes.com/politics/firstdraft/2015/05/15/george-stephanopoulos-apologizes-to-viewers-on-clinton-donations/?_r=0.
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are asked, and I do not even think they know they are doing it, but they are
moving back to their comfort level. And they are not viewing these quite as
dispassionately as perhaps they would a case on class actions.
Another thing—that is one segment of my topic, but the other thing I was
asked to talk about—was the big stick that the government carries. When you
are in any kind of investigation when speech is involved or any kind of
government enforcement, you are dealing with government resources versus
private resources, and the magnitude of what can be brought to bear is very
different. Oftentimes, you have candidates, when they are dealing with a
government investigation; they cannot or will not fight. Again, elections are
won by small shifts. They cannot take up this battle thirty days before an
election. They have to essentially give in or back away from it. They do not
want that on their record. They do not want that on their public tombstone.
When you do get into a full-blown investigation, it can be highly intrusive and
overbroad. Search warrants. There are search warrants that are now being used
in these types of cases. People are waking up at 7 AM in the morning. There
are government agents and sheriff’s deputies standing outside their door because
of a campaign speech matter, because of a donation matter. Those search
warrants are sought in an ex parte, much like was discussed a moment ago, secret
environment so there is no one to give the counterpoint when the search warrant
is sought.
Another thing that this society has to address is a paper case. So if you are
going in on a search warrant on a gun, this is black-letter law. You cannot look
in a drawer that the gun would not fit in. When you are going in with a search
warrant on a campaign finance violation, any piece of paper you have is fair
game because it might contain the information they are looking for.40 So
records, checkbooks, and family records are hauled out of these houses, and
people’s lives are sorted through. Oftentimes, they will go in on a campaign
finance violation and do an investigation over here, and they will end up finding
what have you, something on the computer that is not appropriate, and people
are convicted for things that have nothing to do with campaign finance
violations. And there is no practical redress for this. Again, long before a
probable cause determination, long before you have an identifiable judge
involved, these cases play out.
Subpoenas issued by a grand jury, federal grand juries particularly I know of,
and state grand juries, the grand jury foreman signs them ahead of time and puts
them in a drawer. It is not like there is a real considered action as to whether
that subpoena can be drawn.

40. See David Futterman, The Warrant Requirement, 81 GEO. L.J. 862, 870–71 (1993)
(explaining that a warrant may include a “catchall phrase” where the officer may seize an entire
class of items, as long as there is probable cause supporting the seizure of the items).
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Bank records. If bank records are sought, by law, you cannot be notified that
those bank records have been sought.41 So there may be a candidate, or a
501(c)(4), that have had their bank records pulled, and they have no idea of that.
E-mail providers. Again, often there is no notice.42 Investigators will have
years of e-mails that the campaign activist does not even know about.
Moving to the other area, the IRS cases that we are seeing, we represent
NorCal Tea Party Patriots in one of the lawsuits against the IRS. We have the
case in Cincinnati, and they ask ridiculous questions about associations and
intent—intent of what you are going to do in the future—and those are very
intrusive to someone participating in the political process.
And against all this, everything I have talked about up until this point is
defense, how you play defense on these cases, but sometimes we want offensive
redress. We want to go in and hold someone accountable long after the fact, and
there are procedural difficulties when you are trying to defend, but when you are
talking about the government, when you are trying to go on the offense, it is
nearly impossible.
Use the IRS case as an example.43 Without a doubt, the Inspector General
found that the dissenting groups were targeted by the taxing authority for
political speech reasons.44 The government Inspector General found that.
Anyone in a law school class would say, “well, that cannot be allowed.” But to
try to do something about that, to try to weave through the procedural roadblocks
to seek legal vindication of an important constitutional right may be impossible.
Two of the cases in D.C., the IRS cases, have been basically kneecapped already,
and the one that we are dealing with in Cincinnati, there are significant
procedural roadblocks that we are trying to negotiate.45
Finally, in closing, what I would like to say is a year later—let us all think
about Tom DeLay. He won.46 He was completely vindicated, and I think he
41. See 12 U.S.C. § 3409(a) (2012) (authorizing banks to delay notice to a customer if the
presiding judge or magistrate finds that notice may hamper the investigation).
42. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b) (2012) (authorizing disclosure, without providing notice to the
customer, of electronic communications if the governmental entity requesting disclosure has a
warrant), vacated as unconstitutional by United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir. 2014),
opinion vacated en banc 573 F. App’x 925 (11th Cir. 2014), and en banc in part 785 F.3d 498
(11th Cir. 2015), cert denied No. 15-146, 2015 WL 4600402 (Nov. 9, 2015).
43. See NorCal Tea Party Patriots v. IRS, No. 1:13-CV-341, 2015 WL 1487112, at *1 (S.D.
Ohio Apr. 1, 2015) (alleging the IRS of partison targeted scrutiny practices based upon the group’s
political predispotition).
44. But see INAPPROPRIATE CRITERIA WERE USED TO IDENTIFY TAX-EXEMPT
APPLICATIONS FOR REVIEW, TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION 8 (May
14, 2013), https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2013reports/201310053fr.pdf.
45. See NorCal Tea Party Patriots, 2015 WL 1487112, at *1. Some of the procedural
roadblocks include the IRS’s claim that it cannot provide the requested discovery because tax
returns are protected from disclosure. Id.
46. See Ed O’Keefe, Tom DeLay Conviction Overturned by Texas Court, WASH. POST
(Sept. 19, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2013/09/19/tom-delayconviction-overturned-by-texas-court/.
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would probably tell all of us that it is very hollow. An investigation many times
in political speech cases, campaign finance cases, if it is done the wrong way,
the investigation is the harm, the allegation is the harm, long before there is a
probable cause finding. Again, as I said before, in the academic context, the
answer is clear. They cannot do that. In the real context, sometimes they can
do that, and you can suffer those consequences.
[Applause.]
JUSTICE DAVID R. STRAS: Thank you. Our next speaker is Professor
Destro, who is a Professor of Law and founding Director of the Interdisciplinary
Program in Law and Religion at The Catholic University of America, Columbus
School of Law. Among other notable accomplishments, Professor Destro once
served as a Commissioner on the United States Commission on Civil Rights.
His work spans a pretty broad swath of First Amendment law, including the
religion clauses, but also includes the right to free speech as well. Please
welcome Professor Destro.
[Applause.]
PROFESSOR ROBERT A. DESTRO: Well, thank you. It is great to be here.
Let me first thank a couple of the people on the panel for giving me the
opportunity to participate. I want to thank Eugene [Volokh] for inviting me to
participate, and the members of the panel for including me in the discussion of
a very important topic.
Let me begin with my experience as co-counsel in the Susan B. Anthony47
case. In that case, we saw “in real time” what “First Amendment Due Process”
really means. My remarks will draw from my lawyer’s “real time” experience
in First Amendment litigation.
I thought that Aaron [Caplan]’s presentation on civil orders, civil harassment
orders [set the stage very well]. I know that everybody laughed when we talked
about the Wyoming definition of harassment as any action taken “with intent to
harass another person . . . the person engages in a course of conduct reasonably
likely to harass that person,”48 but in real life, as I have told my students, “you
cannot make most of this stuff up.” The reality is far more strange than anything
the fertile mind of a law professor can dream up.
So my modest contribution today is going to be to focus on the importance of
good lawyering in First Amendment cases. Professor Caplan’s discussion of the
civil harassment proceedings underscores the wisdom of the late Justice
Brennan’s observations in Speiser v. Randall,49 that “the outcome of a lawsuit—
and hence the vindication of legal rights—depends more often on how the
factfinder appraises the facts than on a disputed construction of a statute or
interpretation of a line of precedents.”50
47.
48.
49.
50.

134 S. Ct. 2334 (2014).
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-506(b) (2015).
357 U.S. 513 (1958).
Id. at 520.
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I would like to make three basic points drawn from my own experience as a
professor who teaches both constitutional law and legal ethics, and as an advisor
to churches: “The church as a regulated industry” is the way I would describe it.
My view is that the most basic due process issues are the ones that occur during
the pleading, advising, discovery, and pretrial motion stages.
The first of the three points is the most important, so I will discuss it last. It
is that ineffective assistance of counsel is as much an evil to be prevented or
avoided in First Amendment cases as it is in criminal cases. Second, practicing
lawyers often do not understand the process by which constitutional facts are
pleaded and proved in First Amendment cases. Third, and lastly—and perhaps
non-controversially—the problem begins with the way we teach Constitutional
Law 101.
As I said: I will discuss these issues in reverse order.
Let me start by asking a question: What are the basic skill sets that students
should acquire in Constitutional Law 101? I think that nearly all of us in the
room today would agree that many students find constitutional law to be a
difficult subject. Many find it extraordinarily difficult to grasp what Justice
Brennan described as “the complex of strands in the web of freedoms which
make up free speech.”51 They also find it very difficult to understand the
relational nature of constitutional disputes captured so well in Robert Jackson’s
three-part analysis in Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer.52
First- and second-year law students, at least in my experience, prefer rules.
As we try to teach analysis, history, and our thoughts about the roles of judges
in a democratic republic, they are using commercial outlines to teach themselves
the rules. Unless they have been given an opportunity to work on a real case, or
at least to work on a hypothetical that is based on a real case, they are not going
to really understand the complexity of the first part of Robert Jackson’s
observation that “constitutional lawsuits are the stuff of power politics in
America,” but many of them will have virtually no understanding of the
important role that lawyers and plain old civil procedure play in the process.53
Jackson put it well at the end of that quote when he said, “the politics of power
is a most important and delicate function, and adjudication of litigation is its
technique.”54

51. Id.
52. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Justice Jackson, in concurrence, suggests that constitutional power
disputes between the executive and legislative branches should be analyzed in the context of three
situations: (1) “[w]hen the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of
Congress, his authority is at its maximum”; (2) “[w]hen the President acts in absence of either a
congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only reply upon his own independent powers”;
and (3) “[w]hen the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of
Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb.” Id. at 635, 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
53. ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: A STUDY OF A CRISIS
IN AMERICAN POWER POLITICS 287 (1941).
54. Id. at 288.
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Any experienced constitutional litigator knows that standards of review are
not black-letter rules. They are instructions to lower courts and trial counsel on
how to draft pleadings, conduct discovery, and present evidence. This is why
Professor Philip Bobbitt, a number of years ago, suggested that we might want
to re-conceptualize what a constitutional law textbook should look like.55 Right
now, they are collections of heavily edited cases that are often short on the facts,
and they emphasize what appear to the untutored to be black-letter rules. He
suggested that we might want to consider reimagining law school textbooks
along the lines of business school casebooks, and that way to teach people how
to deal with real cases.56
Viewed from this perspective, a case like Iqbal v. Ashcroft,57 is not simply, as
most students learn it, a civil procedure case involving the sufficiency of a
pleading under Rule 8; it is a statement by the Court about the nature of the
evidence that must be pleaded and proved in order to make a case to impose civil
liability under the Constitution on a senior officer of the United States.58 Nor is
United States v. Lopez59 a case about the nature and extent of congressional
power under the Commerce Clause.60 That is one issue. It is, to be sure, a
Commerce Clause case, but to a trial lawyer, it is or should be about the
jurisdictional facts that show, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether the
defendant or his goods have moved in or utilized instrumentalities of interstate
commerce.61 Cases such as Iqbal and Lopez are much easier to understand—
and to teach—if they are put into the procedural posture in which they arose. A
series of short problems that asked the students and professors to view the case
from a litigator’s perspective or an advisor’s vantage point would go a long way
to improving and defining learning outcomes in constitutional law.
I might add, in view of Todd [Graves’s] comments about the often surreal real
world environment, learning about how real cases are litigated would also
eliminate, I would think, what a Maryland judge asked me in a trial many years
ago: “Why are you quoting the Constitution of the United States? This is
Western Maryland.”
[Laughter.]
PROFESSOR ROBERT A. DESTRO: Let me give you an example of what I
am suggesting. One of the first exercises I give my students in constitutional
law is to write a letter to James Madison on behalf of William Marbury
55. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 7 (1982)
(suggesting that there are indeed five “archetypes” of constitutional argument—an historical
argument, a textual argument, a structural argument, and a prudential argument—instead of the
traditionally exclusive “doctrinal argument[s]” grounded in mere precedent).
56. See id.
57. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
58. See id. at 685–86.
59. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
60. See id. at 558–59.
61. Id. at 566–67.
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demanding the delivery of the commission that had been signed and sealed but
not delivered before John Marshall left his office that night. Their initial reaction
is to be nonplussed. They thought that Marbury v. Madison was about the power
and duty of the judicial branch to say what the law is.62 Well, it is about that,
but it is also about William Marbury, his commission, and the remedies that
might be available to him under the circumstances.63
The second point is related to the first: practicing lawyers just do not
understand the process by which one puts a constitutional case together. In a
nutshell, the second point is that the way we teach constitutional law has a
profound effect on the way it is practiced, and this is a problem [that each of our
panelists has identified].
Students need to understand how the cases they are reading got to the court.
In order to do that, they have to think like lawyers. This means that we have to
train them to think more about their clients than about the rules of law that they
are trying to establish.
So imagine, if you will—I want you to do a little thought experiment with
me—that the year is 1993, and you are standing, as I was, in front of a room not
unlike this, full of lawyers who represent churches and religious organizations.
All of them are trial lawyers. My job was to explain to them why churches were
losing nearly every time they raised the First Amendment as an affirmative
defense in cases involving sexual misconduct by clergy and other employees.
Fast forward to 2005. You are the lawyer at the Christian Legal Society who is
considering what stipulations might be drafted in order to make the case go a
little faster and be litigated a little cheaper. Should we agree that the University
of California’s Hastings Law School policy64 was really an “all comers policy”
that it is neutral both on its face and as applied, or should we start the long, slow
slog through the depositions of the dean and the others who crafted the policy?
Fast forward again to 2014, and you are advising a group of religiously-affiliated
universities here in Washington, D.C. who are looking at new legislation that is
going to penalize them for being religious organizations and teaching their views
of biblical morality.
In every one of these cases the “due process” issues arise early and often. The
lawyer must explain exactly what it is that the client needs to do and, basically,
to show them how to do it.
I am going to close by making the last point, and that is that ineffective
assistance of counsel is as much an evil to be avoided in First Amendment cases
as it is in all others. I will give you a quick example that is taken from the record
62. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803).
63. Id. at 138.
64. See Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 668 (2010) (rejecting a First
Amendment challenge to the University of California-Hastings College of Law’s policy requiring
official student organizations to accept all students regardless of the their status or beliefs). The
Supreme Court upheld the school’s policy noting that it was a “reasonable, viewpoint-neutral
condition on access to the student-organization forum.” Id. at 669.
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of one of the most significant Establishment Clause cases in the last fifty years:
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris.65
At issue was the constitutionality of a school voucher program that allowed a
limited number of low-income kids in the Cleveland school district to attend
private and parochial schools anywhere in the state.66 At the time it was
challenged, the Supreme Court had drawn a distinction between cases in which
government programs aid the schools directly and cases in which the parents got
the money.67 That was the rule.
One would think that stipulations on which the trial court based its ruling in
the summary judgment motion would have been clear on this point. They were
not. At best, the record was fuzzy concerning how the voucher program actually
worked, and the lawyers writing the amicus briefs had to explain it. There are
two briefs68 where that “follow the money” story is told, but it is not in the
record.
Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion tells you how important those facts
were.69 She said, and I quote:
[G]iven the emphasis the Court places on verifying that parents of
voucher students in religious schools have exercised “true private
choice,” I think it is worth elaborating on the Court’s conclusion that
this inquiry should consider all reasonable educational alternatives to
religious schools that are available to parents. To do otherwise is to
ignore how the education system in Cleveland actually functions.70
The remainder of her opinion, her concurring opinion, and her vote were not
based on theory. Her vote was based on the plain old facts of the case. In making
that point, she took a sideways swipe at Justice Souter, who dissented, by saying,
“it places in broader perspective alarmist claims about implications of the
Cleveland program and the Court’s decision in these cases.”71
So I end by telling you: “Look, due process starts [and ends] with good
lawyering.” Not everybody who gets out of law school is qualified to litigate a
constitutional case, but many who see it as the “stuff of power politics” want
badly to do so. I would suggest here that the Federalist Society might make a
great contribution to the improvement of “due process” in First Amendment
cases by sponsoring some CLE courses on how to litigate constitutional cases.
We need it. Thanks.
[Applause.]
65. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
66. Id. at 643–45.
67. See id. at 649.
68. Brief for Individual Freedom et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 3–5, Zelman,
536 U.S. 639 (2001) (No. 00-175); Brief for Nat’l School Boards Ass’n et al., as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondent at 2, Zelman, 536 U.S. 639 (2001) (No. 00-1751).
69. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 672 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
70. Id. at 663.
71. Id. at 668.
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JUSTICE DAVID R. STRAS: Thank you, Professor Destro. Anchoring our
group today is Alan Morrison, who is the Associate Dean for Public Interest and
Public Service at George Washington University Law School. For most of his
career, Dean Morrison worked for the Public Citizen Litigation Group, which he
co-founded in 1972 and directed for over twenty-five years. Among other
courses, he teaches civil procedure and election law, and I think it is fair to say
that there are very few areas of civil rights law in which he does not have at least
some experience. I will turn it over to him.
[Applause.]
PROFESSOR ALAN B. MORRISON: So I want to begin by telling you how
I start my civil procedure class and my constitutional law class. I tell my
students I am going to change the name of the law school, and they look at me,
and I say, “I want to change the name of this place from the law school to the
fact school because facts,” as Bob [Destro] just mentioned, “really do matter in
everything we see and do in the law.”
And so the question I want to address today is: how do we show or prove facts
in First Amendment litigation? Sometimes it is easy when the plaintiff has a
case like United States v. O’Brien.72 You know that he burned the draft card.73
That is not a problem of proving it. You know you want to make a contribution
above certain limits. That is easy to prove. What is harder to prove and, thinking
about proving is, how does the government prove its justification, or how do
you, as opposing the government, try to respond when the government asserts
certain interests as being their justification.
I am going to take the easy way out and talk about a case that I am currently
litigating in the D.C. Circuit en banc that was heard late September called
Wagner v. FEC.74 This is a case in which Congress has passed a statute to 2
U.S.C. § 441(c)—recently re-codified as 52 U.S.C. § 30119—in which it forbids
any individual who has a contract with the Federal Government from making a
contribution in connection with any federal election to the President, Member of
Congress, political party, political committees, ideological or otherwise.75 You
cannot make any contributions whatsoever. It applies to challengers. It applies
to minor parties. It applies to candidates and everybody.
Under the federal system, the only candidates for federal office are the
President and Members of Congress, but they have no authority under federal
law to write any contracts. Occasionally, Congress will pass a bill that has a
contract in it, but that is by far the exception. Most contracts are written and

72. 391 U.S. 367, 369–72, 377–78 (1968) (finding that while the burning of a draft card
constitutes speech according to the First Amendment, the indictment for burning the card was not
an unconstitutional abridgment of his rights because there is a compelling government interest in
efficiently conducting the draft).
73. See id. at 369.
74. 793 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
75. Id. at 3.
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approved by administrative officials at the agencies under very complicated and
detailed laws dealing with government contracts.76
I have three plaintiffs. One of them was a law professor who had a consulting
contract with the Administrative Conference of the United States for which she
was paid $12,000 for writing a 144 page paper and attending about ten meetings.
The other two are former employees of USAID who took retirement and then
were rehired as government contractors, sitting next to the very people they sat
next to before, doing essentially the same kind of work that they did before when
they were employees. They were allowed to make contributions then, but now
that they are contractors, they cannot make contributions.
Corporations with government contracts, which are what I always thought
were the major persons affected by this law, cannot make contributions
themselves, but they can set up political committees. Their political committees
have to bear the name of the corporation, and the corporation can solicit and pay
for the solicitation of stockholders and officers of the corporation who can give
to the political committee, and the political committee can make all the
contributions that the corporation cannot. So the Boeing PAC, for example, can
make contributions just like everybody else can, and of course, so can the
officers, the shareholders, and of course, if you happen to have a limited liability
corporation of which you are the sole stockholder and sole employee, you can
make the contributions. Even though you have an LLC that has the contract with
the government, it cannot make the contributions, but you can.
This law applies only to government contracts. It does not apply to grants,
even though today, the Federal Government spends much more money on
grants. There are many more grants that affect it, but it does not cover grants at
all, and of course, it does not cover contributions that are rounded up by people
who would like to be ambassadors and who actually make large donations
through their bundling and get to be ambassadors. That is okay as long as they
do not do it to get a contract.
There is an equal protection claim in this case, but I want to frame this as a
First Amendment analysis, and I am going to assume that strict scrutiny does not
apply, and that all that has to be shown is the appearance of corruption. The
question is, how can the government prove the appearance of corruption? Now,
in some cases, such as McConnell v. FEC,77 in the part of the case that dealt with
the party rules, there was actually a lot of testimony before Congress as to what

76. See 48 C.F.R. §§ 1.101, 1.301(a) (2014) (outlining the standards for all government
contracts and enabling administrative agencies to supplement the Federal Acquisition Regulations
with additional regulations and procedures).
77. 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310
(2010). In McConnell, the Court held that the part of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act that
attempted to eliminate the use of soft money—that is, money given to a political party to influence
elections—was constitutional as the restriction on First Amendment political speech was minimal
vis-à-vis the legitimate government interest in preventing the corruption of the election process. Id.
at 138–40.
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was going on, why the sponsors of the law wanted to expand the coverage to
allow only certain kinds of contributions to be made by the parties.78 Members
of Congress, who are actually experts in this area, testified about it. And then
there were some people, like lobbyists and others, who, as some want to say,
committed truth by telling what they really were doing with this money when
they gave it to the political parties. So in that case, you actually had some
evidence.
The problem was, in this case, this law that I am talking about was not some
recent amendment to the U.S. Code. This law was passed back in 1940 at a time
when there were very few government contracts, although there were enough to
be worried about. Coercion was already prohibited at this time, and there was
some evidence of scandals, mostly people who were being asked to contribute
to the Democratic Party or to buy advertisements of the Democratic Party book
who were buying books at way above the market price of the books, and that
was plainly an effective contribution. Nobody ever considered at the time
actually putting a limit on contributions. They just said you cannot do it at all,
and if you read the legislative history, there are some wonderful quotes in there
from members who quote Justice Holmes who said, “[t]he petitioner may have
a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a
policeman.”79 They thought that applied to government contracts, you have no
constitutional right to have a government contract, and you certainly do not have
a right to speak if you have a government contract, and we can penalize you by
putting you in jail.80 All right.
So the question then is, do you have to show—you the government—have to
show some kind of scandals, and if so, what kind of scandals? Well there is no
evidence of this, of course, because there is the law that has been in effect for
many years. Although I have to tell you this, a number of my colleagues,
including some of them who teach government contracts, were unaware of this
law until I called it to their attention. In fact, they were much more worried
about being sued over the law than they are worried about being a plaintiff in
the lawsuit and having the FEC discover that they actually made contributions
at a time when they were not supposed to be making them.
So how do we try to show this? Or, does the government have to show
anything at all? Can they just simply say that there is an appearance of
corruption? Or, do they have to have some evidence of this? The “this” being,
of course, that contracts that will be awarded directly by federal employees or
indirectly through Congress through the appropriation process, will be
influenced by an otherwise contribution by a would-be contractor
We had a couple of people who had been witnesses, one who had run the
government contracts program. He filed a declaration. He was deposed, and in
78. See id.
79. See McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E.2d 517, 517 (Mass. 1892).
80. See H.R. Rep. No. 93-1, pt. 3, at 270 (1973).
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the end, he said: “Sure. Anything is possible.” There was no way we can rule
out the possibility that somebody someday may have made a contribution that
might have this indirect effect, that may have gotten them a government contract.
So the big question was, what does the FEC have to do to prove this? The
FEC took the position that it could take legislative notice of legislative facts, and
by that, it meant that it could cite newspaper reports, television stories, criminal
cases that mostly were found in newspapers or other places like that, and that it
did not have to put on any live witnesses that we could examine and crossexamine. The FEC did not have to put anybody on to be deposed. It did not
have to put any affidavits in, and that these were all legislative facts in the
context of the First Amendment.
I assumed that the facts were accurate; that is to say, the FEC reported what
was there. The difficulty is they are only relevant if they have comparable
situations to what we are talking about here, and the problem was you could not
tell from the reports of most of these cases whether the situation was comparable
for several reasons. First, it was because the laws on how contracts are let are
very different in the states, which is where these examples came from, and
municipalities. Second, the campaign finance laws were very different in these
situations. And third, often you could not tell who the contribution came from.
In many of the cases, the contributions came from people who, under the FEC
scheme, would be allowed to make contributions, that is, the shareholders and
officers, and not the individual contractors as well.
Some of these, of course, were bribes, criminal convictions under federal laws
of different things, and the FEC said, “Well, this is a scandal, and that is a
scandal, and we can use those to do the same thing.” And so the real question is
who should have the burden of showing what, in a case involving the First
Amendment? Should the court be allowed simply to do what judges do in
nonjury cases from time to time? This was ultimately a question of law. Take
it for what it is worth, whatever that means. In fairness to the FEC—and I hate
to be too fair to the FEC—this was seventy years ago that the law was passed,
and so we did not know what was happening. It is hard to prove a negative over
that period of time, but the basic question is, can Congress do this at all? Do
they have the authority to make these kind of broad laws, and then what do you
do about over-inclusion and under-inclusion? Why are grants not covered?
Does Congress have to explain why the grants are not covered? Does the FEC?
And what about corporations? If corporate PACs can make contributions, who
has the burden of proof, and what do we mean by proving that there is no
appearance of impropriety as well?
My favorite example in the case, and this is what the FEC said to my clients
as to why the ban is okay. You are not completely forbidden from doing
anything. You cannot make a contribution, but you can have a fundraiser. You
can have the fundraiser at your house, and you can invite anybody you want, and
they can bundle all the contributions you want. And indeed, you can actually
contribute $1,000 toward the cost of the fundraiser, invitations, food, and so
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forth, but you cannot write a check for $10. That is the rule that is supposed to
guard against the appearance of corruption.
The question is, who has to justify what in this case, or should we just simply
say that the government has to come forward with real evidence by real people
to show the danger in the First Amendment? Or, some would say: “Is that a copout? Are you just assuming, essentially, strict scrutiny without being willing to
call it that?” My own view is that this is the First Amendment, and that when
government is trying to show that something bad is likely to happen, it ought to
have to come forward with something more than rumors and newspaper reports
and speculation. After all, we know from the Bose81 case that courts will
independently review findings of fact, but those findings of fact are only as good
as the evidence that comes in, in the front end, to prove them.
Thank you very much.
[Applause.]
JUSTICE DAVID R. STRAS: Thank you, Alan. So I tried really hard to figure
out a question that could apply to all five panelists, and I think I have come up
with a question that could apply to three of them, and certainly, the others are
free to interject as well. And by the way, after I ask my one question, please feel
free to line up and get ready to ask questions because we will be taking questions
from the audience.
This question comes from the conference call that we had before this panel
when we were trying to decide what to name the panel. The question is: what
role does procedural due process play, if any, in these types of questions?
Professor Volokh said, “Well, not at all.” I found that interesting because I wrote
an opinion last year dealing with orders for protection, and one of the hardest
parts of the opinion was actually stating what the district court had to do on
remand.82 In the due process cases, we have the guidance of Mathews v.
Eldridge83 in terms of what procedures need to be provided.84 But in the First
Amendment context, there is really no similar guidance from the Supreme Court.
So when we are talking about burdens of proof and additional procedures, what
are the procedures required in First Amendment cases? How do the courts
decide what procedures should apply to these types of claims?
[Pause.]
JUSTICE DAVID R. STRAS: Anyone.
PROFESSOR ALAN B. MORRISON: Am I in the three or the two?
[Laughter.]
JUSTICE DAVID R. STRAS: You might be in the three, actually.
81. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
82. See generally Rew v. Bergstrom, 845 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 2014).
83. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
84. See id. at 335 (creating a due process analysis that balances interests by considering three
factors: (1) the private interest of the parties affected; (2) the risk that the administrative procedures
would erroneously deprive the private interest; and (3) the government’s interest).
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PROFESSOR ALAN B. MORRISON: All right. Well, as I have indicated, I
do think that we ought to start thinking about proving issues of fact by the way
we prove them in the old-fashioned way, at least in the first instance, and maybe
we should have some greater relaxation at the edges, but we at least ought to try
to get witnesses on the stand, or at least at deposition, to say things that people
can cross-examine them about instead of trying to cross-examine a law review
article or a learned treatise of some kind, or a newspaper article. I think we need
to get back to thinking about that.
I have written a piece in the Lewis & Clark Law Review about that issue in
connection with the Brandeis brief,85 which I got to be looking at, and I wrote it
in connection with trying to prove facts in the context of same-sex marriage
cases and how they go about proving various kinds of discrimination and
justifications. I found myself very uneasy with how facile some of the efforts
were to prove various kinds of issues that were on both sides of the case and how
one should go about proving them. So I think that although the due process
clause is not often spoken of in evidentiary terms, I do think it has some
resonance, and we ought to think about it a little bit more.
PROFESSOR AARON H. CAPLAN: One of the things I actually like about
Mathews v. Eldridge86 is not so much its three-part test, because that does not
guide you to many conclusions. But I do like the basic idea that we have a
sliding scale, that the more serious the deprivation of liberty or property, the
more procedures we are going to have. The application is very case-specific, so
it is hard to draw any great principles, but at least I am willing to say I like the
idea that the more serious the deprivation, the more procedures we should have.
I also like the idea that depriving someone of his or her freedom of speech is
pretty serious. So if you put those two together, I cannot tell you exactly where
that leads, but these two general principles are worth building into the
discussion.
It is interesting that Professor Morrison mentioned the marriage cases,
because that is something I was thinking about when he was speaking. In the
wave of litigation that was happening four or five years ago, pretty much all of
the cases challenging marriage laws were decided on summary judgment, and in
that posture the government won. But in the first two cases that actually went
to trial, the plaintiffs won. When the government, or the interveners who were
defending the law, actually needed to put on witnesses and say what the
government interest is, the judges who actually heard that testimony said:
“Wow! That is really not persuasive.” So I want to second his motion to get
more witnesses involved.

85. Alan B. Morrison, The Brandeis Brief and 21st Century Constitutional Litigation, 18
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 715, 717–19 (2014) (exploring the types of evidence and the level of
scrutiny that may be required in analyzing the constitutionality of statutes dealing with issues such
as same-sex marriage).
86. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334.
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PROFESSOR ROBERT A. DESTRO: Well, I would certainly second that.
The example that I gave at the end, if you are in the process of advising a client
who is going to have to defend themselves in a same-sex benefits case, you are
going to have to sit down with that client and figure out what they are going to
say on the stand, and you are going to have to look at very seriously what the
government’s asserted interest is, and you are going to have a depose a number
of people in order to find out how it is going to be administered. That is why I
used the Christian Legal Society87 case as an example, because the case turned
eventually on a stipulation that basically proved the case.
So I think that the idea is when we teach con law, we teach it in terms of
standards of review and any rational basis, but we never think of that in terms of
evidence. What is the basis? Why should we defer? And what do you mean
when you say the interest is compelling? There needs to be evidence on all of
those things. Otherwise, all the Court is doing is citing rules.
I will give you one last example. We did a series of—we did some research
a number of years ago on prison cases—and what we found is that every single
time the formulation of the compelling state interest test was compelling state
interest and no less burdensome alternative. That meant that the state lost, that
when you looked at the cases where there was actually evidence and the state
won, they never mentioned the normal standards of review. So when you
actually look and see about how these cases work, cases on which there is really
good evidence come out differently. I think Aaron just made that point.
PROFESSOR EUGENE VOLOKH: So I think that is quite true of the cases
where the issue turns on factual evidence. There is this broader, interesting
question of what procedures you use to discover the evidence and what
procedures you can use to restrict speech in light of the evidence.
Should permanent injunctions, for example, be allowed in libel cases? The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court says no, under the Pennsylvania Constitution.88
The California Supreme Court and several others say yes.89 The Texas Supreme
Court says you cannot have an injunction against a future speech—even an
injunction prohibiting specific statements—but you can have an injunction to
take down existing speech.90

87. 561 U.S. 661, 676–78 (2010).
88. See Willing v. Mazzocone, 393 A.2d 1155, 1158 (Pa. 1978) (holding that a permanent
injunction prohibiting a protester from demonstrating with defamatory signs against a law firm
violated Pennsylvania’s Constitution because it abridged the protester’s First Amendment right to
free expression).
89. See Balboa Island Vill. Inn, Inc. v. Lemen, 156 P.3d 339, 353 (Cal. 2007); see also Hill
v. Petrotech Res. Corp., 325 S.W.3d 302, 309 (Ky. 2010) (adopting the “modern view” that
defamatory speech may be enjoined after a determination that it is false); Retail Credit Co. v.
Russell, 218 S.E.2d 54, 62–63 (Ga. 1975) (affirming an order for injunctive relief to enjoin
defamatory behavior); Carter v. Knapp Motor Co., 11 So.2d 383, 385 (Ala. 1943) (granting
injunctive relief, in the absence of adequate remedy at law, for a charge of continuing defamation).
90. Kinney v. Barnes, 443 S.W.3d 87, 89 (Tex. 2014).
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But what kind of facts could one come up with to support one or another such
approach, one way or the other? There certainly are interesting factual questions
about what tends to cause an undue chilling effect and what does not. Yet it
would be very hard to imagine the social science evidence that would
demonstrate that.
So I do not know how to think about factual evidence here. Using Mathews
v. Eldridge might be an interesting idea. I do not think any of those First
Amendment cases—many of which, have roots before Mathews—actually use
it. But, as Aaron points out, it is hard to see where Mathews exactly will get you
because that is the nature of Mathews.
So I do not know if there is a general answer to how courts should resolve
these questions: when you should change the burden of proof; when you should
raise the quantum of proof; when you should allow criminal liability; or when
you should allow third-party standing. There certainly has been no shared
pattern for dealing with these things.
JUSTICE DAVID R. STRAS: Fair enough. Questions from the audience?
ATTENDEE: Hail Hans von Spakovsky who served on the FEC. I do have a
procedural question for you. I always thought it was a little odd that, as you
know, jurisdiction over going after violations of federal campaign laws are
divided between the FEC and the Justice Department. The FEC has jurisdiction
over civil violations. The Justice Department has jurisdiction over criminal
violations. And my question is this. People have criticisms of the FEC, but the
one criticism you never hear about the FEC is that it is engaged in a partisan
prosecution, and that is because it takes a bipartisan agreement. You have to
have commissioners of both parties agree to pursue an investigation, and that is
not true with the Justice Department. The party controlling the White House has
the ability, if it wants to, it can engage in partisan criminal prosecutions, and I
wonder whether you all think that that should be stopped and whether
responsibility for criminal prosecutions also should be shifted over to the FEC
from the Justice Department.
PROFESSOR ALAN B. MORRISON: Well, I will answer that question. I do
not think the FEC should have criminal prosecution authority. It would be a bad
idea. There would probably never be another criminal prosecution, no matter
what the facts were, but am I right that the Justice Department at least ordinarily
will not bring a criminal prosecution unless it has been referred to it by the FEC?
ATTENDEE: That is incorrect.
PROFESSOR ALAN B. MORRISON: It is not correct. Okay. I apologize. I
thought most of them came that way.
PROFESSOR EUGENE VOLOKH: So it is an interesting question, what the
policy should be. Another question is: is there a constitutional basis for saying
that certain prosecutions can only be brought by nonpartisan or bipartisan
bodies? That would be a very strange rule under existing constitutional doctrine.
I am not saying it necessarily will be the wrong rule, but it would be quite
unusual, I think.
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Some procedural guidelines like that are kind of taken off the table, in part,
because of tradition. Traditionally, prosecutions are brought by executive agents
who are responsible to a political official or a particular party. So that is an
interesting question, and it may be more a matter of statutory design than
constitutional command.
PROFESSOR ALAN B. MORRISON: The opposite position is the one that
the executive branch took in Morrison v. Olson.91
PROFESSOR EUGENE VOLOKH: Yes.
PROFESSOR ALAN B. MORRISON: —when they said that all prosecutions
had to be done by the President, or under the President. They could not give it
to somebody else. That case was independent counsel.
JUSTICE DAVID R. STRAS: All right. I want to make sure Todd [Graves]
has a chance to respond.
TODD P. GRAVES: In my experience, I would not want to see that taken over
by the FEC because of the failings, or the shortcomings, in prosecution by the
DOJ when they happen. I do not think they are either Republican or Democrat
from the top. Those actors are very careful about what they do, and out of
100,000 people, it really is only a few handfuls that are actually political, one
way or the other.
I think the real danger, in the DOJ, is the guy who is laboring in anonymity,
and suddenly, he gets to make this decision. It is made, oftentimes, at a very
low level, by someone who does not have a good understanding of the campaign
finance issues. That is the danger, more than the Republicans want to get the
Democrats and the Democrats want to get the Republicans. I think many times
it is, sort of, the government official kind, that wants to get people who are
spending a lot of money in politics, is more of a danger.
JUSTICE DAVID R. STRAS: All right. Did you want to—
PROFESSOR ROBERT A. DESTRO: Just one little point, and that is, picking
up on Todd [Graves’s] point. Having been involved in a case like Susan B.
Anthony that has a lot of political angles to it, a lot of the problems we saw
actually are better understood as legal ethics—prosecutorial discretion—
questions, rather than problems of proof. The prosecutors did not actually care
that they could not prove the case. They had their guy, and they were going to
have his pelt on the wall. So these legal ethics questions—why are the
prosecutors picking this case, and do they have the facts to do it?—are critical
components of the due process issue. It is amazing to me that the low level of
attorney competence often explains how First Amendment cases get screwed up.
JUSTICE DAVID R. STRAS: Next question.
NICK ROSENKRANZ: Nick Rosenkranz, Georgetown Law School. Several
panelists have made reference to ways in which the First Amendment is unique,
91. 487 U.S. 654, 696–97 (1988) (upholding the constitutionality of legislation that vests the
appointment of independent counsel for investigating the executive branch in a U.S. Court of
Appeals Special Division).
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doctrinally unique and then theoretically unique. For example, the overbreadth
doctrine, third party standing doctrine, things like this. And as a matter of the
rationale for the First Amendment, this idea of chill, that we are particularly
concerned about chill in the First Amendment context and maybe more than in
other contexts.
The panelists, though, have not made mention of the unique grammar and text
of the First Amendment. So the First Amendment unlike the other Amendments
to the Bill of Rights, written in the active voice and says, “Congress shall make
no law.”92 Is there some relationship between the unique text of the First
Amendment, on the one hand, and some of these unique doctrines that we have
heard you talk about on the other hand?
JUSTICE DAVID R. STRAS: Anyone want to take that one?
PROFESSOR EUGENE VOLOKH: Much as I admire my co-blogger Nick’s
work on this, I am a little skeptical about it for a couple of reasons. One is,
actually, a lot of these things are filtered through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Of course, the great bulk of First Amendment cases consist of cases involving
restrictions on state and local law. And so there, the relevant provision is either
that no state shall deny people a due process of law or that no state shall deprive
people of liberty.
PROFESSOR ALAN B. MORRISON: [Speaking off mic.]
PROFESSOR EUGENE VOLOKH: Fair enough. I am not sure that that
should matter, but maybe Nick might disagree. But in any event, it is the same
language that applies, that incorporates the First, Second, Fourth, and such
Amendments.
Also, one thing that struck me in doing the very limited historical research I
have done on original meaning of the First Amendment—which I have done in
the area of symbolic expression, civil liability, and the scope of the freedom of
the press clause—is that (though you see some arguments to the contrary made
in the Sedition Act debate), lots of people during that era viewed the First
Amendment as very similar to state constitutional provisions on speech and
press (mostly press, a lot more press than speech). And those provisions were
written grammatically quite differently from the First Amendment. In fact, in
many ways, they were written quite similarly to other constitutional protections
in those state constitutions.
So that is what makes me hesitant to think that the particular text of the First
Amendment as such—notwithstanding the similar treatment of the similar
provisions of the state constitution, and the similar filtering of that through the
Fourteenth Amendment—should affect the way we think about First
Amendment procedures.
PROFESSOR ALAN B. MORRISON: I would also add that textual focus
would mean that the President and the courts could issue rules and make
decisions based on anti-First Amendment values, and I think that is a danger.
92. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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PROFESSOR ROBERT A. DESTRO: I am going to disagree with you just a
little bit on that one.
PROFESSOR ALAN B. MORRISON: Go ahead.
PROFESSOR ROBERT A. DESTRO: I think one of the easier ways to look
at that question is via legislative jurisdiction. The fight over the meaning of the
First Amendment was first anticipated in McCulloch v. Maryland.93 Under John
Marshall’s reading in McCulloch, if the government could create a “Bank of the
United States,” it could, by parity of reasoning, have a “Church of the United
States.”94 For exactly that reason, the Framers and supporters of the First
Amendment in the States wanted assurances that Congress could use its powers
to do that kind of thing. And that is why I think Hamilton’s point about the
federal government not having a “particle of spiritual jurisdiction”95 is a good
way to think about the First Amendment.
Consider this jurisdictional question as it relates to the expansion of the
“administrative state” into the intricacies of press, church, political party, and
the political process itself and saying: “Here is how you have to do business.
Here is who you have to hire. Here is what you can and cannot say. You have
to have . . .”—et cetera. So I will leave it at that.
JUSTICE DAVID R. STRAS: All right. We will take one more question, and
we will have to have brief answers because we have only three minutes left.
MICHAEL FRANCISCO: Michael Francisco in the Colorado Attorney
General’s Office. My question is about proving this state interest, these facts
that you have talked about. It seems like there is a number of sources to do that.
You could point to what other courts have said a state interest is in a particular
law. You could look to legislative history. You could hire an expert, or the
lawyers could just make it up and argue. And I am wondering if you would
comment on kind of the comparative value on different sources for proving a
state interest.
PROFESSOR ALAN B. MORRISON: Well, I guess I would say as far as prior
cases are concerned, if they made it up there, too, or if the lawyers in that case
made it up, that would not—it is just repeating the same problem of the past.
I think the legislative history is useful in some cases, and we should not
disregard it. Whatever Justice Scalia thinks about it as a general proposition,96
I think in some cases, it is useful and more useful than anything else because at
least it is contemporaneous with the explanation for why they were doing it.
93. 17 U.S. (1. Wheat.) 316 (1819), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST.
amend. XVI.
94. Compare id. at 331–33 (holding that the Constitution impliedly grants Congress the power
to establish a national bank when it is an appropriate means of exercising its enumerated powers);
with U.S. CONST. amend. I (prohibiting Congress from establishing a state religion).
95. THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander Hamilton).
96. See Graham Cty Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 559
U.S. 280, 302 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that legislative history should not play a role
in the Court’s interpretation of a statute).

218

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 65:185

But as I say, I would prefer to have something closer to what we would see in
a trial, maybe not exactly the same. I do not have any problem with expert
witnesses into social sciences. They were put forth, as Robert [Destro] said, in
the same-sex marriage cases, and they were debunked seriously by the other side
and disregarded by the judges. But at least they have had an effort up there, and
I am in favor of seeing those kind of witnesses on both sides of the controversy
when there are disputes about whether a law would have one effect rather than
the other.
PROFESSOR AARON H. CAPLAN: I want to pull in Carolene Products97
into the comments that were just made. Nowadays, most of the discussion of
that case is about the famous footnote. The merits are discussed less often, partly
because it is actually very difficult to figure out from the opinion what was being
argued. Here is what I think was going on. The Carolene Products Company
wanted to have a trial to decide whether Congress’s findings about the dangers
of filled milk were rational, or if instead the law was just passed as a favor to the
dairy industry. The Supreme Court said the company did not get to have a trial
about that.
A lot of my students think that the reasoning Carolene Products actually goes
too far. “If every single Member of Congress had been bribed, why should I not
be able to put on evidence of that?” Carolene Products seems to say you cannot.
So that is what you are up against—or that is what makes it easy for lawyers to
go in and make up assertions about the government’s interests and the proof
supporting them.
PROFESSOR EUGENE VOLOKH: Let me just add one area of concern. I
like the idea of evidence being introduced at trial. It sounds much like normal
trials.
But the next step from that is, okay, this particular one trial judge has heard
evidence on whether same-sex marriage is a good idea or whether some gun
control policy is a good idea or whether some other economic, social, whatever
facts are or are not the case, and now we review that for clear error because he
got to see those experts and squint at them and said, “Ooh, I think you are lying.
I think you cheated on that”—
[Laughter.]
PROFESSOR EUGENE VOLOKH:—“I think your statistics are just bad.”
Sure, in these situations we do not have deference to the legislature, and the
decision is left to the courts. But I certainly do not want the process to be, “Well
you happened to draw this trial judge who happened to draw this conclusion,
and now we review that for clear error.” That may be perfectly sensible as to,
well, did this person pull the trigger or not—but not so good, it seems to me, as
to these legislative facts. The Supreme Court ought to be able to review those.
PROFESSOR ALAN B. MORRISON: Reverse votes.
PROFESSOR EUGENE VOLOKH: Exactly, exactly.
97. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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JUSTICE DAVID R. STRAS: All right. I am under strict orders to keep this
on time, so please thank our panelists for their wonderful presentations today.
[Applause.]
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